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The most celebrated “return” of religion on the international scene has 
been considered by analysts, scholars, and diplomats mainly as a confir-
mation on a wider scale of the hypothesis of a “post-secular” era. What 
is missing, however, is a reflection on the present-day functioning of 
religions in connection with the systemic analysis of international re-
lations in a phase of global transformation. If world religions are to 
be taken seriously in the field of international relations, this would 
require an approach to their role in the international system as a struc-
tural element rather than a mere cultural phenomenon with only a 
derivative or secondary influence on world order. In particular, it will 
be useful to make a clear conceptual distinction between the two di-
verging paradigms of “globalization” and “universalism,” as embodied 
in an explicit or implicit way in many world religions today; and to 
investigate if and how religions could contribute to the formation of a 
global collective identity, both symbolic and pluralistic. 
Religions and International Relations
The most celebrated “return” of religions on the international scene 
has been considered by analysts, scholars, and diplomats as a con-
firmation on a wider scale of the hypothesis that we have entered 
a “post-secular” era.1 This phenomenon would, therefore, not be 
confined to internal political systems. It should also not be read 
as a completely unexpected and surprising implication of the old 
theory of domestic analogy, that would be vindicated in cultural 
rather than in political terms. The controversial perspective of the 
domestic analogy is not the correct way to conceptualize the “con-
tamination” of the international political sphere with religious and 
even theological categories. In the words of Julia Kristeva, while 
today humankind is capable of destroying the earth in the name of 
beliefs, religions, or ideologies, at the same time, the “constituent 
religiosity” of the human being is being recognized.2 
In their analysis of the role of religions on the international 
scene, experts have chosen, on the one side, to focus on the impact 
of new religious radicalisms on the relations among “civilizations.” 
On the other side, they have devoted their attention to the pos-
sible role that motivations based on religious beliefs can play in the 
process of conflict prevention and resolution. There is, however, a 
different reading of the new religious phenomena based on the 
1. Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of Inter-
national Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century (New York: 
Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005). 
2. Julia Kristeva, “Intervention at the Day of Reflection, Dialogue and Prayer for 
Peace and Justice in the World,” Assisi, October 27, 2011. 
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complex interplay of national, international, and trans-national ef-
fects of religious identities. What is needed, in my opinion, is a 
reflection on the function of religions in connection with the sys-
temic analysis of international relations in a phase of global trans-
formation. If world religions are to be taken seriously in the field of 
international relations (IR), such a reflection must approach their 
role in the international system as a structural element (without 
any pretention of exclusivity or “centrality”), rather than a mere 
cultural phenomenon with only a derivative or secondary influ-
ence on world order.
One way of contributing to clarity in this regard is to try to be 
more accurate in the various characterizations of the connection 
between religions and world politics. It is this particular relation—
between religions and world politics—that, in my opinion, best de-
scribes the new role of religious factors in the international arena. 
I will make the case for the role of religions in the international 
realm that goes beyond pure Westphalian and state-centered cate-
gories, but at the same time avoids characterizing religions as mere 
“global faith-based NGOs.” Religions have a say in world politics, 
but they cannot be portrayed reductively as lobbies or constituen-
cies. They operate in a public sphere that does not overlap com-
pletely with the international political sphere. Another important 
marker that I propose to adopt is the alternative between an ap-
proach to religion as a general “category of the spirit” and concrete 
religions as a vast phenomenology of human religious needs. It is 
the plural form “religions” that is relevant for world politics.
This being the case, within this larger scheme we should then 
distinguish at least the following dimensions: 




I will refer to these dimensions through my own interpretation 
of their defining characteristics. Interstate relations focus on for-
eign policy; internationalism focuses on legitimacy of international 
bodies and international democracy; trans-nationalism focuses on 
collective identity; and, finally, globalism focuses on the agenda of 
world politics. 
Religions and Interstate Relations
Religion from the interstate point of view is religion inside a box. It 
is a way of combining religion and nationalism that is a matter of 
governments rather than peoples. It can take very different forms 
with very different outcomes. Two heterogeneous cases are, for in-
stance, the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Russian Orthodox 
Church after the fall of the Berlin Wall (and to a certain extent 
even before). Political Islamism often takes the form of a national 
political factor. Strictly speaking, the phenomenon of a growing 
relevance of political Islamism should be dealt with more as a mat-
ter of comparative politics than a specific subject of international 
analysis. If we adopt this perspective of the level of analysis, reli-
gion and interstate relations is a subject that Kenneth Waltz will 
perhaps include in the “second image” in the study of IR, that is, 
in the motivations of state behavior in the international arena. As 
such, religions could be considered relevant as fundamental driv-
ers of foreign policy rather than genuine international politics. I 
maintain that only internationalism, trans-nationalism, and global-
ism are the relevant dimensions for an IR theory that would study, 
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at the appropriate level of analysis, the role and the place of reli-
gions in world politics. 
Religions and International Democracy 
As far as internationalism is concerned, what is interesting is the 
relation between religions and the concept (and practice) of inter-
national democracy. There are many ways to conceptualize in politi-
cal terms the relatively new notion of “international democracy.” 
The one to which I will refer here has to do with procedures and 
decision-making mechanisms of the “international community,” 
understood as a web of international organizations both of an in-
tergovernmental nature and a supranational character. In this ver-
sion, international democracy refers to the principle of inclusion 
and to fair and politically justified rights and “votes” of govern-
ments in international bodies. 
There is another conceptualization of international democracy 
that is less state-centered and more focused on participation of 
individuals and groups in the decision-making process of interna-
tional organizations, as well as on their ability to influence political 
choices and agendas at the international level. This second version 
could be better defined as global or trans-national democracy. The 
debate on the obsolescence of the features of the “Westphalian 
state” and on the creation of political conditions for cosmopolitan 
citizenship (a contemporary, partial version of the Kantian project 
for “perpetual peace”) is very relevant but it would take me off 
topic. To be brief, I fully share the analysis of David Held and An-
thony McGrew when they affirm that: 
the contemporary world order is best understood as a highly 
complex, interconnected and contested order in which the 
interstate system is increasingly embedded within an evolv-
ing system of multilayered regional and global governance. 
There are multiple, overlapping political processes at work at 
the present historical conjuncture.3 
This perspective is even more complex when compared to the 
global democracy model, and has been defined by Held and Mc-
Grew as the domain of a “cosmopolitan social democracy” nurtured 
by some of the most important values of social democracy—such as 
the rule of law, political equality, democratic politics, social justice, 
social solidarity, and economic effectiveness. From this cosmopoli-
tan social democracy approach, those principles should be applied 
to the new “global constellation” of economics and politics.4
In dealing with the notion of international democracy, I am 
basically concerned with some fundamental, or “primordial,” as-
pects of the international system, particularly the debate on the 
legitimacy of the international order. Legitimacy is the result of 
many elements, including the composition of the political bodies 
considered, their deliberative patterns, and, last but not least, the 
very outcome of the decision-making process. In several discus-
sions regarding the legitimacy of new bodies of the global gover-
nance, like the G20, what seems to create consensus is the obvious 
statement that those international fora, in order to be legitimate, 
must first and foremost demonstrate their usefulness. That is, they 
must be perceived not as perfectly representative, but as reasonably 
functional and effective. Other elements of legitimacy are consid-
ered complementary and optional.
3. David Held and Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the 
Great Divide (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), p. 130.
4. Ibid., p. 131.
64C LAR ITAS | Journal of Dialogue & Culture | Vol. 1, No.1 (March 2012) 
However, legitimacy is more than a satisfactory outcome. As 
Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler point out, “there is very little in 
the international relations literature that directly addresses the role 
of religious legitimacy in international relations.”5 Religious legiti-
macy in international relations should be understood in a radically 
different way vis-à-vis the tradition of the metaphysical founda-
tion and justification of power in the internal order. The notion 
of religious legitimacy in the international system is unrelated to 
theoretical reflection on the source and the nature of power. Ac-
cording to Fox and Sandler: 
There are three reasons to believe that religious legiti-
macy should be influential in international relations. First, 
normative factors are having an increasing influence on 
international relations. Second, the growing literature on in-
strumentalism demonstrates that other cultural factors such 
as nationalism and ethnicity have provided legitimacy for 
political activities. Third, identity is clearly an influence on 
international politics and religion is an influence on identity.6
I consider as relevant two of the three factors of religious legitimacy 
listed by Fox and Sandler: the normative functions of religions re-
garding global governance and their potentialities in forging or 
strengthening collective identities. 
Other interesting suggestions regarding legitimacy in the in-
ternational system come from the approach known as the “inter-
cultural construction of global democracy,” which is based on the 
assumption that the prevailing frameworks of global governance 
5. Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religions into International Relations 
(New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004), p. 36.
6. Ibid., p. 45.
lack democratic legitimacy on the grounds of Western cultural 
domination. The conceptualization of global democracy should 
come as a result of an interregional, intercultural, interdiscipli-
nary, ideologically pluralistic, and action-oriented epistemologi-
cal dialogue. The primary aim of this approach is “to counter the 
ideational inequalities that arise when certain ways of knowing 
the world are arbitrarily subordinated and sometimes also forcibly 
repressed and to explore how cultural unilateralism in global gov-
ernance can be replaced with a ‘positive inter-culturality.’ ”7 
When it comes to the structures of global governance, one im-
portant debate also addresses the level of inclusion of the different 
formats. Among the many aspects of the inclusiveness, religious 
diversity should be taken into account as a way of strengthen-
ing the legitimacy of these informal bodies. For instance, in the 
G8, there is no country with a Muslim majority; also, there is no 
doubt that the presence in the G20 of countries like Indonesia, 
Saudi Arabia, and Turkey constitutes an important element in the 
creation of a more balanced representation of one of the world’s 
most widespread religions. This conclusion should not sound sur-
prising. In the UN system, the geographical representation in the 
main bodies is considered one way to ensure a pluralistic structure 
of that universal organization. In the EU a fierce battle is raging 
around the predominant languages in the operations of the EU 
institutions. These are fundamental criteria in assessing the degree 
of cultural pluralism and diversity of international organizations 
in order to strengthen their legitimacy. Why exclude religion from 
this puzzle? 
7. J. A. Scholte, “What is Globalization? The Definitional Issue—Again,” Center for 
the Study of Globalization and Regionalization Working Paper No. 109/2002, Uni-
versity of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom. 
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Unfortunately for the supporters of selected formats, the need 
for more inclusion can also work against the legitimacy of infor-
mal international bodies. As an example of such a problematic 
outcome, I would recall the position on the formats of global gov-
ernance taken by the 2010 Religious Leaders’ Summit. There, the 
participants criticized the composition of such bodies by pointing 
out how “power and economic dominance are the basis for inclu-
sion in a G8 and G20 global leaders’ summit,” and denouncing, 
although in a footnote of their document, the fact that “not repre-
sented in these summits are 172 members of the United Nations 
where proposals to address structural causes of poverty and eco-
logical devastation are currently under discussion.”8 
Religions and Trans-Nationalism
It has become commonplace to consider globalization as the an-
tithesis of universalism (as it happens in the “Samuel Huntington 
vs. Francis Fukuyama” discourse), but the interplay between the 
two categories is more complex and nuanced than a mere oppo-
sition. This is particularly true when we try to understand how 
religions adapt to, or, on the contrary, resist globalizing forces. In 
a recent work, Olivier Roy writes that the major religious move-
ments of our times are in a process of “deculturation.”9 Religions, 
according to Roy, are reformatting themselves as global faiths 
rather than expressions of a national culture since “today’s religious 
revival is first and foremost marked by the uncoupling of culture 
8. World Religious Leaders’ Summit, 2010, “A Time for Inspired Leadership and Ac-
tion,” http://www.faithchallengeg8.com/pdfs/2010%20Interfaith%20Statement%20
-%20English.pdf. 
9. Olivier Roy, Holy Ignorance: When Religion and Culture Part Ways (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 2010).
and religion, whatever the religion may be.”10 In this interpreta-
tion, religions are no longer confused with other elements deemed 
constitutive of cultural identity; on the contrary, they represent a 
way to “escape” from a “framed” cultural environment and so to 
avoid falling into the “identity trap.” This is an accurate description 
of the “liquid” version of globalization. In Roy’s vision, it means 
“uprooting from given societies in an attempt to develop systems 
of thought that are no longer linked to a given culture, systems of 
thought or practices, behavior, taste, and modes of consumption.”11 
This process raises concerns since “the success of all forms of neo-
fundamentalism can be explained by the fact that, paradoxically, it 
vindicates the loss of cultural identity and allows a ‘pure’ religion to 
be conceptualized independently of all its cultural variations and 
influences.”12
From his perspective, José Casanova points out in a recent article 
that religions are affected by the same latent schizophrenia that hits 
other territorial, political, or symbolic aggregations: the contextual 
presence in the same narrative of the attachment to the “roots” and 
the ambition of a projection onto the global scene. Particularism, 
even localism, on the one side, and cosmopolitism and universal-
ism on the other side, not only coexist but very often progress 
together. “Actually,” writes Casanova, “one finds practically every-
where similar tensions between the protectionist impulse to claim 
religious monopoly over national and civilizational territories, and 
the ecumenical impulse to present one’s own particular religion as 
10. Olivier Roy, “Islam in Europe,” in Michalski Krzysztof, ed., Religion in the New 
Europe, Conditions of European Solidarity Series, vol. 2 (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2006), p. 131.
11. Ibid., p. 132.
12. Ibid., p. 133.
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the response to the universal needs of global humanity.”13 Religions 
are becoming more and more de-territorialized and de-centered, 
as is happening with Pentecostalism, which Casanova considers 
“the first truly global religion” that is the more visible manifesta-
tion of an “emerging global denominationalism.”14
In Casanova’s view, it is high time to admit that there are “mul-
tiple modernities,” among which modernity based on Western 
rationality is only one version and as such does not necessarily rep-
resent a universal process of human development. For Casanova, 
global religions are progressively incorporating features that can 
be described as forms of the generalization of the Islamic notion 
of umma, as trans-national imagined religious communities that 
present fundamental challenges both to international relations 
theories that are still functioning within the premises of a West-
phalian international system and to secular cosmopolitan theories 
of globalization.15 
So, on the one hand, religions rightly underline the need to 
protect cultural and spiritual identities; on the other hand, initia-
tives and fora like the Alliance of Civilizations and Religions for 
Peace help in creating the awareness of a shared identity, a collec-
tive identity. The latter can be crucial if we really want to see a con-
crete implementation of the idea of global common goods, such as 
the protection of the environment and the availability of food and 
water for all the inhabitants of the planet. If religions “go global” 
without strings attached, this phenomenon could also be concep-
tualized as a way for religions to move beyond the shortcomings 
and contradictions of globalization, if we understand globalization 
13. José Casanova, “Public Religions Revisited,” in Hent de D. Vries, ed., Religion: 
Beyond a Concept (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), p. 30.
14. Ibid., p. 32.
15. Cf. ibid., pp. 33–34.
according to Fukuyama’s interpretation as a process of worldwide 
diffusion of one dominant culture. This process would give reli-
gions the chance to present themselves in terms of interpretations 
of the world with the ambition to embody some level of universal-
ism, that is, some critical vision of the reality that can be an alter-
native way of understanding the global era. 
The core issue here is how religions “de-nationalize” in order to 
make their inclusive claims flourish. Religious identities are not a 
danger per se to international relations; on the contrary, religions 
could reinforce the idea of a global common identity, both sym-
bolic and pluralistic. From the standpoint of international theory, 
one field of research could be exploring a possible constructive 
role—if there is any—of those processes leading to the uncoupling 
between religions and their original backgrounds. In other words, 
we should consider the possibility that the process of deconstruct-
ing the territorial and culture-specific frame of religions might 
obviously imply the destruction of some identities, but also the 
assembling of new elements capable of creating more comprehen-
sive and more inclusive structures of meaning. 
When Benedict Anderson wrote about “imagined communi-
ties,” he made it clear that a nation as a product of cultural imagi-
nation should not be confused with the notion of “invention.” 
Anderson argued that any nationalism is a particular kind of cul-
tural artifact, a cultural product that by the end of the eighteenth 
century was reproduced in different regional contexts. As Ander-
son wrote, the creation of these artifacts: 
was the spontaneous distillation of a complex “crossing” of 
discrete historical forces; but that once created, they be-
came “modular,” capable of being transplanted, with vary-
ing degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social 
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terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly 
wide variety of political and ideological constellations.16
An imagined community is not an imaginary community. What 
counts for the “imagination” is the scale of the social and political 
body, which goes well beyond the possibility of a direct experi-
ence of the subject. As Anderson put it, “all communities larger 
than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even 
these) are imagined.”17 Anderson described the “imagined com-
munities” as being a result of the fragmentation of the medieval 
universalism and the process of secularization and individualiza-
tion of an ethnic-cultural-religious complex into the new frame 
of the nation. What we might be experiencing today is a sort of 
“reverse process,” in which religions try to rebuild their univer-
sal claims for peace and unity without necessarily destroying the 
nations, but by extending the scale of the “imagined community” 
beyond that of the traditional boundaries of the state. 
Another interesting perspective on this whole issue is provided 
by the constructivist approach to international relations, especially 
as far as the implications of the notion of “collective identity” are 
concerned. According to Alexander Wendt, the possibilities for 
collective action in international relations cannot be explained in 
full without assuming that interaction at the systemic level changes 
state identities and interests. For Wendt, “the key structures in the 
state system are intersubjective, rather than material,” and “state 
identities and interests are in important part constructed by these 
social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by 
16. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalisms (London and New York: Verso, 1991), p. 4. 
17. Ibid., p. 6.
human nature or domestic politics.” Wendt claims that these 
intersubjective systemic structures consist of “the shared under-
standings, expectations, and social knowledge embedded in in-
ternational institutions and threat complexes, in terms of which 
states define (some of ) their identities and interests.”18
What is the role of religions in those processes of identity shap-
ing and reshaping? Is what is true for states also true for trans-
national and non-state actors? Here we have an entire program 
of research. It is widely recognized that if one wants to put in 
place a functioning global governance, a certain degree of “like-
mindedness” among the members would be necessary, although it 
is clear that no real effectiveness is possible if we seek a full “com-
monality of values.” To use Wendt’s terminology, we may need at 
least some low-intensity or thin “collective identity” if we really 
want to put in place a functional and legitimate structure of global 
governance. 
Religions and Globalism
From the point of view of world politics rather than from the per-
spective of IR as a discipline, religions should be understood mainly 
as a phenomenology, not an ontology. To borrow the language of 
one of the most debated issues of the failed European Constitu-
tion, if the “roots” of a civilization matter, no less important are 
the fruits of such a metaphoric “tree.” In the realm of world poli-
tics, religions are more important in terms of doing rather than in 
being.19 
18. Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 
American Political Science Review 88 (1994): 389.
19. M. K. Sheikh, “How Does Religion Matter? Casual Effects of Religion in Inter-
national Relations,” paper presented for the International Studies Association, New 
York, February 2009.
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In diplomatic circles that are becoming more and more atten-
tive to the subject of religions in world politics, you can often hear 
the firm statement that “We don’t do religion; we don’t do theol-
ogy; we do international politics.” This might sound, and perhaps 
it is, simplistic to a political scientist, who knows how difficult it 
is to work with independent variables because the result of such 
an attitude is the aprioristic assumption that religion is something 
that we find in nature and the only thing we can do with it is 
to study its effects. However, there must be a middle ground in 
which one needs to know “few important things”—to follow the 
famous Waltzean epistemological recommendation—about what 
a religion is in order to better understand the consequences and 
implications for world politics.
What I propose here is a simple categorization of religious 
narratives along the conceptual continuum of inclusion/exclu-
sion. How a religion sees the vast and diverse world of peoples 
and nations in terms of cooperation or competition, connection or 
confrontation, is relevant for IR theory and practice. Through the 
prism of inclusion and exclusion it is possible to conceptualize the 
important function of religions both as “clients” and “vectors” of 
trans-nationalism. 
According to Richard Falk, there is a “uniting feature of reli-
gious consciousness, the oneness of human family that can give 
rise to an ethos of human solidarity, the unity of all creation, and, 
with it, the sense of both the wholeness of human experience and 
the dignity of the individual.”20 In many religious traditions we 
20. Richard Falk, “A Worldwide Religious Resurgence in an Era of Globalization and 
Apocalyptic Terrorism,” in Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, eds., Religion in In-
ternational Relations: The Return from Exile (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003), 
p. 196.
can find the same basic idea of “universal community,” or “human 
family,” whose “working method”—so to speak—should be con-
stituted by the implementation of the Golden Rule on a world 
scale. This idea has been dismissed for a long time as a commend-
able ethical aspiration, irrelevant for the international order and 
un-influential in terms of the adoption of policies that reflect 
asymmetries of power and interests.
On the contrary, I think that such a universal approach as an 
alternative to the ideological globalism could give some more con-
crete and democratic meaning to the vague and somewhat oligar-
chic idea of global governance. For instance, I consider very useful 
the gathering of representatives of the world’s religions and spiri-
tual traditions on the occasion of major political summits like the 
G8 and G20. In those cases, religions can influence the agenda of 
international bodies through supporting or advocating for specific 
policies on political and moral grounds. That is why the meeting of 
prominent members of world religions that took place in Assisi in 
2011, under the auspices of the Catholic Church, on the occasion 
of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the previous similar initiative 
held in Assisi in 1986, was an event of utmost symbolic relevance. 
Another promising framework involving religions dealing with 
global issues in a structured way is Religions for Peace, a large 
international coalition of representatives from the world’s major 
religions dedicated to promoting peace. The network’s purpose 
is to create multi-religious partnerships aimed at “stopping war, 
ending poverty, and protecting the earth.” This organization has a 
clear self-consciousness of the potential impact of religious mobi-
lization in helping to solve global issues: “Religious communities,” 
you can read in its mission statement, “are the largest and best-
organized civil institutions in the world, claiming the allegiance 
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of billions across race, class, and national divides. These com-
munities have particular cultural understandings, infrastructures, 
and resources to get help where it is needed most.”21 Similarly, 
the World Council of Churches (WCC), which brings together 
349 Christian churches, is one of the broadest and most inclusive 
among the many organized expressions of the modern ecumenical 
movement. The WCC created a program called Public Witness: Ad-
dressing Power, Affirming Peace through which it aims at challeng-
ing “the economic, social, political and cultural powers” in order to 
offer “a prophetic witness for justice, peace and security.” 
These organizations are just two examples. There are many pos-
sibilities for religions to forge pragmatic, pro-active, and creative 
ways of combining justice, community, and dialogue in interna-
tional relations. If we deal with the topic of religions and global 
governance in terms of “policies” of global governance, there are at 
least two fields that are particularly relevant. First is the relation-
ship between religions and global public goods (namely, environ-
ment, health, and stability). Second is the relationship between 
religions and human security. These are two related aspects of 
what Falk defines as “humane global governance,” as opposed to 
the emergence of “inhumane social patterns” at the global level. 
Falk is persuaded that “religious visions provide a potential po-
litical grounding for humane global governance that cannot arise 
otherwise.”22 Religions based on the paradigm of inclusivity, Falk 
argues, can play an important role in strengthening “globalization 
from below” and provide an alternative vision to the Westphalian 
21. http://www.religionisforpeace.org/about/.
22. Falk, p. 197.
tradition that usually associates solidarity with territorial sovereign 
states.23
Religions and Political Transitions in the Mediterranean 
To refer to a concrete political context in the Mediterranean, re-
ligions can reconceptualize the political narrative of that region, 
too often trapped between geopolitical and deterministic visions 
(“Broader Middle East,” “Middle East and North Africa,” “South-
ern Shore”). Morevover, in the Mediterranean there is a need to 
“compare notes” and exchage points of views on how to overcome 
the current crisis of democracy as a political system in which com-
prehensive visions of the world have been “sterilized” rather than 
considered components of a positive-sum game. The same goes for 
formal and informal international institutions, whose legitimacy 
is sometimes challenged on the ground that they are the offspring 
of a “Westphalian,” state-centric logic of organization rather than 
representative of the global civil society.
In the search for new “models,” Turkey is a case in point. For 
decades, the fulcrum of political debates regarding Turkey was 
the apparent clash between Islam and democracy. Now that a 
southeastern European and Islamic version of the Western “Chris-
tian Democratic Party” model is in power in that country, that di-
lemma seems to be outdated, though naturally not everyone shares 
this view. There are still doubts among European political leaders 
about the ability of the new “confessional” political class to bring 
about the reforms needed to qualify for EU membership. Such 
reservations could be entirely wrong, but the question now is of a 
23. Ibid.
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different nature. Instead of considering religions as an obstacle to 
cooperation and undestanding, Western countries should first do 
their homework, moving away from simplistic and reductionist vi-
sions of the religious sphere in international relations as the realm 
of either intolerance or naïveté. A crucial test of such a move will 
be whether or not we will see a correct and balanced assessment of 
the new political environment in the Mediterranean, where, espe-
cially since the Arab Spring, religions will certainly play a crucial 
role in the framework of fragile transitions toward democracy. 
Pasquale Ferrara, a career diplomat and former head of the Policy 
Planning Unit of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is secretary 
general of the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. He 
received degrees from the University of Naples and the Italian Society 
for International Organization. He served in several overseas dip-
lomatic assignments in Chile, Greece, and the United States, and at 
Italy’s Permanent Mission to the European Union. Ferrara has been a 
visiting professor at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Socia-
les (FLACSO) in Santiago, Chile, and at Georgetown University. He 
is presently professor at the Sophia University Institute and the LUISS 
School of Government in Rome. Ferrara is author of many articles and 
essays on international relations and political thought, as well as six 
books, the most recent being Lo stato preventivo: Democrazia secu-
ritaria e sicurezza democratica (2010).
